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Abstract
The classification decisions of neural networks can be misled by small impercep-
tible perturbations. This work aims to explain the misled classifications using
saliency methods. The idea behind saliency methods is to explain the classification
decisions of neural networks by creating so-called saliency maps. Unfortunately,
a number of recent publications have shown that many of the proposed saliency
methods do not provide insightful explanations. A prominent example is Guided
Backpropagation (GuidedBP), which simply performs (partial) image recovery.
However, our numerical analysis shows the saliency maps created by GuidedBP do
indeed contain class-discriminative information. We propose a simple and efficient
way to enhance the saliency maps. The proposed enhanced GuidedBP shows the
state-of-the-art performance to explain adversary classifications.
1 Introduction
The explanations produced by saliency methods reveal the relationship between inputs and outputs of
the underlying model. In image classifications, the explanations are generally visualized as saliency
maps. A saliency map (SM) is created using the three components: an input x ∈ Rd, a model M ,
corresponding to a function fx(·), and an output class ym. Formally, a saliency map sm ∈ Rd for the
classification of the m-th class can be defined as
sm = g(x,M, ym) (1)
where sm has the same dimensions as the input x and g(·) is a function corresponding to a saliency
method. The value of an element smi in s
m specifies the relevance of the input feature xi to the m-th
class. Here, m could neither denote the ground-truth class nor the class, predicted to be most likely.
In recent years, a large number of saliency methods have been proposed [1–14]. Notably, [15, 16]
show that SMs created by Guided Backpropagation (GuidedBP [3]) are neither class-discriminative
nor sensitive to model parameters. [17] proves that GuidedBP is essentially doing (partial) image
recovery, which is unrelated to the network decisions. In contrast to their conclusions, our numerical
analysis shows that the SMs created by GuidedBP do contain class-relevant decisions.
Most of the existing saliency methods in Equation 1 only consider the SM of the ground-truth class
and ignore SMs for the other classes. [18] argues that meaningful explanations should be robust to
small local perturbations of the input. However, the small perturbation can lead to the misclassification
of neural networks [19, 20]. After perturbation, we would not expect that the explanations always
stay unchanged since the neural networks might make totally different classification decisions. Hence,
we propose that saliency methods should be discriminative to adversary perturbation.
Our contributions can be summarised as follows: 1) We identify class-discriminative information in
SMs created by GuidedBP and propose a simple and efficient way to enhance the created SMs; 2) We
explain classifications of adversary images with the proposed enhanced Guided Backpropagation and
the existing saliency methods. The explanations created by these saliency methods are evaluated via
qualitative and quantitative experiments.
Workshop on Human-Centric Machine Learning at the 33rd Conference on Neural Information Processing
Systems (NeurIPS 2019), Vancouver, Canada. (non-archival)
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
08
41
3v
4 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
1 O
ct 
20
19
(a) Similarity of FE (b) Difference of SM Values
Figure 1: The relationship between two SMs in
each SM pair: a) The Sim-Ratio between two
binarized SMs describes the similarity of Filtering
Effects of them. b) The Avg-Diff between two
unnormalized SMs are computed to describe the
difference of their saliency values.
(a) SMs before Norm. (b) SMs after Norm.
Figure 2: This toy example illustrates how the
proposed method works to enhance the discrim-
inativity of SMs. In plot b, the indexes located
between A and B correspond to the input features
relevant to the m-th class, and the ones between
B and C are the features relevant to the k-th class.
2 Enhanced Guided Backpropagation
Similar to raw gradient backpropagation, GuidedBP [3] propagates gradients back to inputs and takes
the received gradients as their saliency values. The two methods differ only in handling ReLU layers.
In GuidedBP, Gl = Gl+1 ∗ 1Gl+1>0 and Xl>0 where Gl is the gradients of the l-th layer and the X l
are the activations before RuLU layer, and 1 is the indicator function. Since the indicator function
filters out parts of the gradients, the gradients received by some input features can be zeros, which is
called filtering effect (FE). The filtering effect of an SM is formally defined as sm ∗ 1sm>0.
[18] provides a theoretical analysis of GuidedBP. They show that the created SMs of different classes
have similar filtering effects, which means that GuidedBP is not class-discriminative. In the following,
we show the SMs created by GuiedBP do contain class-discriminative information and propose a
simple way to enhance the discriminative information in the corresponding saliency maps.
2.1 Identifying Discriminative Information
sk and sm are the two saliency maps created by GuidedBP for the k-th output class and the m-th
output class. They have similar filtering effects, as theoretically analyzed in [18]. The difference
between them can only be their saliency values, if existing. However, in all published work, SMs are
visualized by normalizing saliency values in an SM and mapping them to a color map [0, 255]. The
possible difference between their saliency values is hidden by the normalization.
In our experiments, we take a pre-trained VGG16 [21] model and fine-tune it on the PASCAL
VOC2012 [22] dataset. Each image in the dataset may have many objects belonging to more than
one class. We select images with multiple labels from the validation dataset. For each image, we
produce n SMs for n ground-truth classes and choose any two of n SMs to form an SM pair (sk and
sm), i.e., we have C2n SM pairs.
For each pair, we compute the similarity between two binarized SMs, which is defined as the ratio
between the number of pixels with the same value and the number of all pixels. The scores of all SM
pairs in the validation images are shown in Figure 1a. All the scores are close to 1, which means the
SMs of different classes have almost the same filtering effect.
Without normalizing values of SMs, we compute their averages. The difference between the two SMs
is defined as Avg-Diff = |Avg1−Avg2|
max(Avg1,Avg2)
. The scores vary from 0 to 0.8 in Figure 1b. In summary,
given a classification, the two SMs sk and sm differ in saliency values instead of filtering effect.
2.2 Enhancing Discriminative Information of Saliency Maps
In this section, we propose a simple and efficient way to extract information about the difference
between the two SMs sk and sm. We argue that the relatively larger saliency values in SMs correspond
to the input features that support a specific class. We extract such class-relevant information by
normalizing the two SMs and subtracting one by another, which is visualized in Figure 2. Figure 2a
shows the saliency values of two SMs where input features are ordered by the saliency values of an
SM sk. The two SMs have zeros in the interval [0, A] since both have the same filtering effect. The
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Figure 3: This figure shows SMs of clean image and adversary
ones. The first column lists the original image and its adversary
ones. Our enhanced GuidedBP reacts the adversary attacks
strongly, while all other the SMs produce similar SMs.
Figure 4: Following the rank of
saliency values of a SM, a certain
percentage of pixels of the adver-
sary image are perturbed. The clas-
sification accuracy on the perturbed
adversary images are shown.
difference between the two SMs is their saliency values in the interval (A, C]. Figure 2b shows the
normalized saliency values where the input features of (A, B] are relevant to the m-th class, and the
ones in (B, C] are relevant to the k-th class.
In classifications of real-world images, the obtained discriminative pixels max(0, (sknorm − smnorm))
for k-th class strongly depend on how the SMs are normalized. A trivial normalization is to divide
the SM by its maximum. However, the maximal value of the SMs (i.e., the maximal local gradient
value in vanilla Gradient approach) are noisy and often outliers [7, 19].
An alternative is the energy-based normalization. The individual SMs are normalized by the sum of its
saliency values |sk| (i.e., the energy of the SMs). The SMs sk = (skr , skg , skb ) and sm = (smr , smg , smb )
are composed of three channels. The discriminative pixels for the k-th class on the R channel are
Diskr = max(0, (
skr
|sk| − s
m
r
|sm| )) = max(0, (
skr
|skr |+|skg |+|skb |
− smr|smr |+|smg |+|smb | )).
Neural networks have different sensitivity to different feature maps and input channels. In a classi-
fication, the sensitivity of channels could be different for different output classes. E.g., in case of
|skr |
|skr |+|skg |+|skb |
 |smr ||smr |+|smg |+|skb | , the discriminative region Dis
k
r = 0, and we lose all the informa-
tion on the red channel. On the contrary case, we might keep too much detail information without
highlighting discriminative features. On other channels, we could similarly lose all the information
or keep too much non-discriminative information.
We propose the channel-wise energy-based normalization to circumvent the problem. We consider
three channels separately. The discriminative pixels of R channel is Diskr = max(0, (
skr
|skr | −
smr
|smr | )).
Similarly, the discriminative information of each channel is accurately identified. The generalization
of the proposed enhancing method to other saliency methods will also be discussed in Section 4.
3 Explaining Classifications of Adversary Images
Inputs with imperceptible perturbation can fool the well-trained neural networks. The Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [19] perturbs an image to increase the loss of classifier on the resulting image.
The Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [23] extends FGSM by taking multiple small steps instead of one
big step. Another superior attack method is the Carlini and Wagner attack (C&W) [24]. In the wake
of defensive distillation, they create the quasi-imperceptible perturbations by restricting their l0, l2
and linf -norms. The l2-norm is used across this paper.
For ImageNet validation images, we create adversary images using the three described attack methods
on pre-trained VGG16. The SMs of clean images and adversary images are shown in Figure 3. For all
the saliency methods except for our enhanced GuidedBP, the SMs created for predicted classes of the
clean image and its adversary versions are visually the same. One might argue that it is an advantage
of the saliency methods: they can still identify the object in the image even when attacked. However,
we argue that saliency methods should reflect the different decisions of deep neural networks. In
other words, they should produce different SMs for clean images and adversary ones.
Since the existing saliency methods always create similar SMs for a clean image and its adversary
versions, they cannot be applied to explain classifications misled by adversary perturbations. Our
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enhanced GuidedBP can identify the relevant evidence of the decisions. For the classification of
the original input (e.g., sheepland dog), the created SM shows that the VGG16 focuses on the
important visual feature of the target object (i.e., the head), while it focuses on class-irrelevant
features (background and body parts) when explaining the classifications of adversary inputs.
The saliency methods can identify the input features that contribute to the classification decision.
We can apply saliency methods on misled classifications of adversary samples. If we perturb the
pixels relevant to the misclassification according to the created SMs, the attack effectiveness will
be decreased. The performance of the model on the perturbated samples can be recovered to some
extent. Figure 4 shows the performance of the model on the adversary samples (C&W attack) when
they are perturbed according to the SMs. We can observe that the perturbation with SMs of our
enhanced GuidedBP can recovery the score better. Instead of claiming that the SM-based perturbation
is an effective defense method, we aim to show that SMs created by enhanced GuidedBP can better
identify the pixels relevant to classifications. When too many images pixels are perturbed, the visual
features of true target objects are lost, which can also lead to low performance of the model.
Figure 5: The figure shows SMs created by
GuidedBP and Enhanced GuidedBP for clean
images and adversary ones. The predictions
under the map indicate the success or failure
of adversary attacks.
To further analyze the adversary-discriminativity of
SMs created by enhanced GuidedBP, we categorize
created adversary images into two categories: Advf
are the ones that fail to attack the neural network
and Advs are the ones that mislead the classification
decisions successfully. For the clean images and the
perturbed images in Advf , the created SMs should
identify the class-discriminative parts. Contrarily,
for the adversary images Advs, the parts identified
in the SMs are irrelevant to the ground-truth label,
which means the network focuses on the wrong parts
of the adversary images when making decisions.
In Figure 5, the image in the first row contains a
vulture. If the created adversary image fails to fool
the neural network, the corresponding SM focuses
on the head of the vulture (see 1st-3rd columns right
of the image). If the attack is successful, the created
SM for the misclassified class (i.e., kite) focuses on
wings of the vulture. As a comparison, the GuidedBP always visualizes all the salient low-level
features of all the images (e.g., the ski, the persons, and the alp in the image of the second row).
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Why is enhanced GuidedBP better? The pre-softmax scores (logits) are often taken as output
scores to create SMs. The previous attribution methods show that the scores of different classes can
be attributed to the same pixels. They explain where the scores themselves come from. Our approach
explains where the difference between logits comes from, which is the exact reason why the network
predicts a higher probability for a particular class, rather than another one. In the optimization of
creating adversary images, the loss of the neural network is increased, which results in the change of
the rank of logits. Our approach can find the evidence for the difference between the scores, i.e., the
rank of logits. The change of the rank is the reason for misclassifications. That is why the enhanced
GuidedBP can explain the classification decisions of adversary images better.
The generalization and limitation of the enhancing method As shown in Sec. 2.1, the important
factor to support the success of enhanced GuidedBP is that sk and sm have similar filtering effects.
When generalizing the enhancing method to other methods, the effectiveness depends on the similarity
of filtering effects. [25, 26] show that SMs can be manipulated due to vulnerability of DNNs. The
limitation of the method is that we assume that the attack methods are not aware of our method.
Conclusion In this work, we identify the class-discriminative information in SMs created by Guid-
edBP and propose a simple way to enhance it. The proposed enhanced GuidedBP can explain
classification decisions of adversary images better. In future work, we will investigate how to regular-
ize the deep neural networks using the captured discriminative information so that the rank of logits
is not easily changed by adversary perturbations.
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